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ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMONLY USED TERMS 
"The Citizens" = The named appellants herein, who are residents and 
taxpayers of Weber County, State of Utah. 
"CLUDMA" = County Land Use Development and Management Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, etseq. 
"GP" = General Plan, or the specific general plan adopted by Weber 
County for the Ogden Valley (Huntsville, Eden, and Liberty) in October, 1996. 
"GP Property" = Land, the use or disposition of which is covered by a 
General plan. 
"Jones" = Rulon Jones, a prominent citizen of Weber County and a 
resident of Eden, in the Ogden Valley. 
"R.O.W." = Right of way. 
"S.O.L." = Statute of limitations. 
"WCPP" = Wolf Creek Park Property (the "subject property"). 
vi 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF FACT 
In addition to Facts 1-15 in Appellants'1 Main Brief, these 
additional Statements of Fact are necessary to reply to issues raised by the 
County and Jones: 
16. Property Sold for Inadequate Consideration. Jones 
purchased the WCPP property for $200 per acre. R. 76-78. Plaintiffs submitted 
an Affidavit that this consideration was inadequate and that the property was 
actually worth at least $2,000 per acre. R. 176. 
17. Failure to Access the County Assessors' Office on Value. 
Gary Laird, the County's Director of Operations, was advising the Commission 
about the sale of the WCPP. R. 481. The County Assessors' Office had a 
number of professional assessors who were capable of assessing the value of the 
WCPP. Laird 55-56, R. 542. Although Laird had gone to the Assessors'Office 
from time to time to seek an opinion on value of other property, he did not recall 
doing it on the sale of the WCPP, and feels that it would have been a "fruitless 
exercise." Laird 55-7, 57:16-18; R. 542-3. 
18. Virtually No Materials to Support Value. Laird admitted 
that he recommended selling the WCPP for $200 an acre based upon the 
Appellants are sometimes referred to herein as "the Citizens." They are five 
residents of Weber County who are familiar with and have used the subject property, 
the WCPP. 
1 
"Peterson appraisal"2 of property in North Fork, many miles away (Laird 66:5-
12; R. 545, 479), and Jones' own statement of value. This was the colloquy: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: You had been to the property to look at it, 
so you knew generally what it looked like. You didn't have it 
staked off, but you knew generally what it looked like, and you had 
the Chris Peterson appraisal. As I understand it, other than Rulon 
Jones' statement of the value, the potential purchaser, you had no 
other source of information about the value. You didn't do any 
independent investigation. Is that a true statement? 
A [Mr. Laird]: I don't think I did. 
Q: So the only source of information you had was, one, 
your own eyeball of the property, which you didn't determine any 
value from; you had, two, the Chris Peterson appraisal, the 
Sinclair appraisal; and three, you had Rulon Jones9 statement of 
value. Is that a fair statement that that's the sources o f information 
you relied upon in advising the county commission? 
A: Yes. 
Laird 54:15 - 55:8 (emphasis added); R. 542, 481-2. 
19. No Independent Appraisal of Value. There was no outside, 
independent appraisal done of the property prior to the sale. Laird testified: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: Fair is a big, big scope there. And you have 
no one who has actually appraised that property. So you don't 
know what it is worth for sure, do you? 
A [Mr. Laird]: Not that specific property. 
Laird 62:13-16; R. 544. 
2
 Laird had earlier explained that the Peterson or Sinclair appraisal was of 
totally different land near "North Fork," which is many miles, as the crow flies, from 
the subject property. Laird could not recall details from the Peterson appraisal, claimed 
that the original appraisal had been returned to Sinclair and that he had no copies. 
Laird Depo. 43-46. So the details of the appraisal and its possible applicability to this 
property is uncertain and doubtful. R. 545, 479. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
- The Public Trust Was Violated -
PUBLIC LANDS SUCH AS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE. PUBLIC 
POLICY DICTATES THAT THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD 
OTHER THAN IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATION. 
A. The Sale Implicates a Public Policy Adverse to the County. 
The County claims that no adverse public policy is implicated with 
respect to the sale of the WCPP to Jones, stating, "77*£ determination of 
appropriate public policy with respect to the sale of public property is a subject 
for the legislature." County Brief p. 28 (emphasis added). The County also 
claims there is a public and legislative policy to allow counties to sell "surplus 
property" without restrictions, such as notice and a hearing. County Brief 
pps. 13-16. The County is wrong on both counts. Several public policies 
contrary to Appellees' position are implicated, including the "Public Trust 
Doctrine." The Public Trust Doctrine is a venerable, well-established principle 
of American jurisprudence which prohibits the sale of public property by local 
governments when the transfer is against the public interest. The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the Doctrine: 
3 
This court has held that . . . public property is held in trust for the 
public and may not be disposed of other than "in good faith and for 
adequate consideration." 
Price Development Co,, LP, v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1247 (Utah 2000) 
(emphasis added, citations omitted). This issue was pled and presented to the 
trial court below. R. 394-95, 119, 16A \ 66, 17 \ 72, 73, 97 and 98. 
The Public Trust Doctrine was violated in this case because the 
consideration of $200 an acre paid by Jones was woefully inadequate (true value 
approximately $2,000 per acre) and it is bad faith to sell a public park without 
public notice and a hearing. 
B. $2,000/Acre Property Was Sold for $200/Acre. 
The County cut a "sweetheart" deal by selling Rulon Jones a 
pristine piece of park land for a fraction of its real value. It is an extremely sad 
commentary. There was no advertising, appraisal, bidding, listing with a realtor, 
or other procedure to determine the real value. See Facts 13, 14, 17-19. 
Substantial evidence was presented to the trial court by way of a sworn affidavit 
of a plaintiff with a real estate background that the value of the property was at 
least $2,000 per acre. R. 176. One sworn affidavit is enough to create a 
contested issue of fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment. Holbrook Co, 
v, Adams, 524 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, the trial court must 
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary 
judgment, and hence it must be assumed that the true value of the property was 
4 
$2,000 per acre. BlueCross & BlueShield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989). This "sweetheart deal" violates the County's public trust, which compels 
the County to safeguard these valuable public lands which are held in trust for 
the people of Weber County. 
It is unlikely that the public would ever get fair value for such a 
piece of property with only one person, Jones, knowing about the potential sale. 
See Fact 14, Appellants' Brief and R. 480, 541. 
C. Public Trust Doctrine Prevents Sweetheart Sales 
for Inadequate Consideration, 
The United States Supreme Court first declared the Doctrine in 
Illinois Central R.R. Co, v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), stating that the 
ownership of public lands: 
is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The 
trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and 
cannot he alienated, except in those instances mentioned of 
parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest 
in the lands and waters remaining. 
Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The Court in Illinois Central considered 
whether the State of Illinois could sell the land under Chicago's harbor on Lake 
Michigan to a private company. It ruled that these lands were held in public 
trust for the benefit of the public at large and that the local government as trustee 
may not sell them. The general principle that governments hold public lands in 
the public trust is a fundamental rule preventing local governments from cutting 
5 
sweetheart deals with private buyers, which result in unique and valuable land 
passing to private control without adequate compensation, as happened in the 
instant case. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the Doctrine as 
applying to a valued piece of rural park land which: 
. . . is not to be diverted to another inconsistent public use without 
plain and explicit legislation to that end. The policy of the 
commonwealth has been to add to the common-law inviolability of 
parks express prohibition against encroachment. 
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,215N.,E.2d 114,121 (Mass. 1966). 
Public parks and park lands are clearly meant to be held in the public trust for 
the benefit of the public, and not to be disposed except in furtherance of the 
interest for which they are held. 
This Court recognized the Public Trust Doctrine in a series of three 
cases which nullified improper transfers of public lands by local governments. 
In Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118 (Utah 1975), this Court considered 
whether Ogden City could close and vacate a public street and make a gift of the 
property to the school district. At issue was whether a municipality could 
dispose of its property under § 10-8-2 of the Utah Code which gives cities the 
power to "sell, lease, convey and dispose of property, real and personal, for the 
benefit of the city." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2 (1953). This is exactly what the 
6 
County claims to be the issue in this case, under the county version of this very 
same statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242. The Court ruled: 
The statute above quoted authorizes a city to dispose of its 
property, real and personal, but it does not authorize a city to 
dispose of its property by gift. The property owned by a city is 
held by the city in trust for the use and benefit of its inhabitants 
and cannot be disposed of by gift without specific legislative 
authority. Even with respect to property held by a city in a 
proprietary capacity it is generally held that a municipality may sell 
or otherwise dispose of such property, in good faith and for an 
adequate consideration. 
Sears, 533 P.2d at 119 (emphasis and double emphasis added). The Court 
nullified the transfer of the street property on the grounds that such a gift was 
a breach of the public trust by Ogden City. 
This Court extended the Public Trust Doctrine to counties in 
MunicipalBldg. Authority v. Lowder, 111 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985). There, the 
Court scrutinized a financing scheme and property transfer between Iron 
County and the Iron County Municipal Building Authority (the Authority) in 
constructing a new county jail. One part of the transaction required the county 
to transfer title of the old jail to the Authority without return consideration. Id. 
at 275. Iron County argued, similarly to Weber County here, that it had 
exclusive authority to transfer the property under §§ 17-4-3 and 17-5-48 (the 
predecessor to § 17-5-242, cited by Weber County as its carte blanche). Id. at 
282. This Court, citing Sears, disallowed the transfer, reasoning: 
7 
[BJecause public property is held in trust for the use and benefit 
of the constituents of the owning entity, Ogden City could not 
dispose of public property other than in good faith and for 
adequate consideration. By parallel reasoning, sections 17-4-3 
and 17-5-48 [currently 17-5-242] authorize the disposal of county 
property only for adequate consideration. 
Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282 (emphasis and bracketed portion added). 
The Court explained that "adequate consideration" meant a "clear 
. . . present benefit that reflects the fair market value.55 Id. Finding that the 
county would not receive any benefit approaching fair market value, the Court 
concluded that "the proposed transfer of the old jail to the Authority in fee is 
beyond the county's statutory power.55 Id. The net effect is that the Public Trust 
Doctrine supersedes the power granted to the counties under § 17-5-242. 
Consequently, while the legislature has given counties the power to dispose of 
their property, the power is not absolute, as Appellees claim here. They are 
required to sell property only in good faith and for adequate consideration or 
fair market value. 
This Court reaffirmed and expanded the Public Trust Doctrine in 
Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 2000 UT 26 (Utah 2000). In that 
case, a private developer challenged a complex subsidy arrangement between 
Orem City and the owners and vendors in a local shopping mall. Plaintiff 
contended inter alia that the subsidy arrangement was illegal as a 
8 
misappropriation of public property contrary to the Public Trust Doctrine. Id. 
at 1246, f 25. 
The Court first reaffirmed its holdings in Sears and Lowder stating 
that counties and municipalities hold public property in trust for their 
constituents and that any transactions must be for fair market value. Id. at 1247, 
THf 26-27. Citing the Public Trust Doctrine, the Court held that: 
when a legislative body enters into a transaction where public 
money or property is given in exchange for something, the good 
faith legislative judgment that the net exchange is for fair market 
value flowing to the entity needs to be supported by 
documentation within the legislative record of an independent 
determination of the value of the exchange. 
Price Dev. Co., 995 P.2d at 1249 f 34 (emphasis added). By way of guidance 
to local legislative bodies on future transactions, the Court stated: 
in the future . . . the ability of a local government determination of 
a net fair value exchange to withstand attack will be in direct 
proportion to the thoroughness of the evaluation of the transaction 
entered into and to the independence and skill of the evaluators. 
Id. at 1249, ^ 3 5 . The Public Trust Doctrine is alive and well in Utah. It 
requires that the local legislative body not only be sure to be paid fair market 
value for property it sells, but that it "act in good faith" and that it seek "an 
independent determination" of the property's value and preserve that 
determination in the legislative record. Id. at 1249, f 34. 
Sears, Lowder, and Price illustrate how Weber County breached 
the public trust. First, the Commission held the WCPP in public trust as a 
9 
"park" for the residents of Weber County. R. 673 (map depicting WCPP as 
county-owned park); see also Fact 2, Appellants' Brief. All property owned by 
Weber County is held in trust by the Commission, and that certainly includes 
this park real estate. Price, 995 P.2d at 1247, f 27. Second, the Commission 
sold the WCPP for far less than adequate consideration. See Facts 13, 14, 16. 
Adequate consideration means fair market value. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282; 
Price, 995 P.2d at 1247, ^ 27. Weber County sold 160 acres of pristine, 
undeveloped, alpine property immediately adj acent to a maj or ski resort (Powder 
Mountain) for a paltry $200 per acre. R. 76-78. Any contention that the 
property is only worth $200 per acre is per se ludicrous. But dispute on this 
makes no difference because the trial court was required on summary judgment 
to accept Appellants' evidence offered by way of an affidavit estimating the fair 
market value of the land to be approximately $2,000 per acre. R. 175. It was 
a quintessential sweetheart deal with the property drastically undervalued. 
Third, the Commission breached the public trust by failing to get 
an independent determination of the WCPP's fair market value as required by 
Price, 995 P.2d at 1249, ffl[ 34-35; Fact 14, Appellants' Brief. Not only is there 
no evidence of any independent assessment of the WCPP's market value in the 
record, the Commission did not even bother to allow bidding or negotiation with 
other potential buyers. R. 542 (Deposition of Gary C. Laird). This is a patent 
10 
violation of the requirement that an independent determination of value be 
evidenced in the legislative record. Price, 995 P.2d at 1249, fflf 34-35. 
D. Conclusion, 
Weber County blatantly and egregiously breached the public trust 
by selling the WCPP to Rulon Jones for inadequate consideration, and without 
a good faith notice and a hearing. This Court should reverse the decision of the 
trial court and rule that the sale is null and void as a matter of law. 
REPLY POINT II 
- The Property Was a "Park" -
THIS SALE DID INVOLVE A "PARK," WHICH NEED NOT 
BE FORMALLY DEDICATED. THE SALE OF A PUBLIC 
PARK IS A CHANGE OF USE, EVEN UNDER THE 
COUNTY'S POSITION. 
A. The Factual Issue of "Park" Status. 
Appellees have elevated the issue of "park" status to a contested 
factual issue which justifies denial of summary judgment. Both the County and 
Jones object strenuously to referring to this property as a "park." Jones claims 
that the 160 acres has "never been operated, maintained or used as a park . . . 
and certainly is not designated park property." Jones Brief, p. 8. Weber 
11 
County's position is similar. County Brief pps. 6-7. Jones and the County thus 
raise contested issues of fact which preclude summary judgment for Appellees.3 
Plaintiffs clearly offered evidence below by way of affidavit that 
the property had been considered and used as a "park" for many years. R. 174-5 
(affidavit of plaintiff Ben Toone). The trial court was therefore required to draw 
all reasonable inferences regarding the status of this property as a "park" in 
favor of the Citizens who are opposing summary judgment. HolbrookCo., 524 
P.2d at 193. We assumed below that the trial court and defendants, for the sake 
of the motions for summary judgment, accepted the property as having "park" 
status. R. 684 and 578-602 (Weber County's Combined Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Weber County's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment does not contest whether 
it was a park). The County and Jones now appear to have backed away from 
that in their briefs, which elevates this issue to a contested fact, which justifies 
denying summary judgment. 
B. No Requirement to Be "Dedicated." 
There is no requirement under Utah law that a park be formally 
''dedicated," as implied by the County and Jones. For example, there is no such 
requirement under Utah Code Title 17 dealing with "Counties." Further, 
3
 However, summary judgment in favor of the Citizens is not precluded because 
the sale of general plan public property without notice and hearing is void whether or 
not the property sold has "park" status. 
12 
Chapter 27, the County Land Use Development and Management Act 
(CLUDMA), does not define park selection or designation in any way. Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-305(l)(a). Thus, to establish park status, it is certainly 
sufficient that the County's own map so designated the WCPP for at least 30 
years before this litigation began. R. 684. 
The County claims some significance to the fact that the Ogden 
Valley General Plan does not "designate" WCPP as a park. County Brief p. 8. 
That is like saying that a restaurant menu offering spaghetti doesn't "designate" 
all of the ingredients in the sauce. Even a cursory review shows that it is clearly 
not the Plan's purpose to "designate" parks. A general plan serves "as a guide 
for community decisions," and identifies "the development and land use 
priorities of Ogden Valley." Addendum 3, R. 509. 
C. No Deed Restriction to Protect Use as a Park, 
The County and Jones claim that since the "recreational use" of the 
property allegedly did not change after the sale to Jones, the general plan 
statutory language requiring notice and a hearing is not implicated.4 To read the 
County Brief, one would think that the failure to provide notice and a hearing 
was an intentional act because "no change in use is anticipated." County Brief 
p. 24; R. 655-56. But, if the County really considered "use" at the outset, why 
4
 Even if this dubious position were true, these defendants totally ignore the 
uncontested change of "use" from public park to private hunting preserve after the 
sale. R. 562. 
13 
is there no record of it? Where is there any declaration of Jones' intended use? 
Why do none of the principals testify of the alleged "use55 consideration in their 
depositions? Why is there no deed restriction or reversionary clause to prevent 
Jones from later changing the use? The deed language (R. 526, Exhibit 2, 
Appellants5 Brief) is absolute, conveying the WCPP with no restrictions at all. 
Limiting language such as "grantee shall maintain the recreational use of the 
property as a park,55 or "the property shall revert to the grantor if the recreational 
use should ever change,55 could easily have been inserted if the County had 
really considered the use at the time of transfer. 
Basically, the County gave the property away, with no effort to 
maintain its use as a park, or even as recreational ground. The County's "no 
change in recreational use55 argument is merely an afterthought to justify its 
illegal act. This is really highlighted by the County's astonishing explanation 
of how the alleged prior recreational use would be maintained after the sale to 
Jones: 
The County's sale of the Property to Mr. Jones did not change the 
use of the Property from the recreational use designated in the 
general plan. Mr. Jones may only use the Property for 
recreational purposes consistent with both the general plan and 
existing zoning. If he wishes to change that use of the Property, 
he must apply for a general plan amendment and zoning change, 
which would require notice and hearing. [T]he prospective 
purchaser's intended use of a parcel property is not only relevant 
but critical to the issue of whether a general plan amendment is 
required under any circumstances, not just the sale of publicly 
owned property. 
14 
County Brief pp. 25-6 (emphasis added). This language so clearly shows the 
logical absurdity of the County's position. Under this view, the notice and 
hearing requirements of § 305 do not occur at the critical juncture when the 
property is sold, or passes from public to private hands, but at some future, 
undetermined date when Jones forms a subjective intent "to change the use of 
the Property." County Brief p. 26. In that event, Jones "must apply for a general 
plan amendment." Id Of course, there is no provision under Utah law for 
private parties to amend general plans. That is a county legislative function. 
Sections 303,304 and 305 address what the government does with GP Property; 
they are not a vehicle for private citizens to procure general plan amendments. 
How could the County ever be expected to accurately determine 
"the prospective purchaser's intended use" (County Brief p. 26) in the first 
place? What is to stop Jones from changing his mind on his "intended use" next 
year? Yet, according to the County, this ephemeral, subjective "change in use" 
by a private person should be the standard as to whether the public is entitled to 
notice and a hearing on the sale of a park! What good would it do to have notice 
and a hearing years after the sale to Jones anyway? By that time, the property 
has already left the public domain. It is like closing the door to the henhouse 
after the fox has paid a visit. There is no mechanism in place for either the 
public or the County to follow and monitor Jones' private, subjective intent. 
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The County's position would totally emasculate notice and hearing 
requirements for the sale of general plan public property. In reality, Jones could 
build condominiums or another hunting lodge there if he wanted, as long as 
zoning requirements were met. There is nothing to stop him. This Court should 
not countenance the sale of a public park for inadequate consideration without 
public notice and a hearing. It violates the public trust. The sale should be 
voided. 
REPLY POINT III 
- Notice and Hearing Is Not Impractical Or Burdensome -
IT IS NOT BURDENSOME OR IMPRACTICAL TO 
REQUIRE COUNTIES TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE 
AND A HEARING BEFORE SELLING PUBLIC PROPERTY 
COVERED BY A GENERAL PLAN. 
A. Introduction. 
Weber County implies that requiring notice and a public hearing for 
the sale of public property covered by a general plan, where no "change of use 
is contemplated," would be impractical5 and impose undue burdens on counties. 
County Brief pps. 19, 23-26. Counties have allegedly heretofore been free to 
sell property anyway they wanted, and without restrictions, so requiring notice 
and hearing will interfere with "legislative intent to afford counties broad 
5
 For example, the County claims: "Appellants . . . have never identified what 
such an amendment might accomplish, how it might be worded, or how it could be 
enacted without changing the designated use of the Property." County Brief p. 26. 
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discretion in cond ucting the sale of real property," and thu • • • - i] -. :JC a 
significant burden. County Brief p. 14. These claims are grossly exaggerated or 
untrue. The burden of mandating notice and a hearing for the sale of general 
plan public lands is minimal. 
i he County's Burden is Small. 
The only "negative" raised by the County is that it would twice be 
required to provide public notice and a hearing (once for the planning 
commission and once for the county commission) Utah Code Ann. , ^ * v i 
and n^ 1 • . . . . ^ i ., , * .- '>.;K . vir..:. 
da) *• > >*'• « ••: * burden. Balanced against this mild burden 
are the significant benefits to the public in having advance knowledge and input 
on the sale of a park. Such benefits for the public are far more important than 
the minor burden on counties of providing noi i., a: . ,ai: :
 r . 
Cost is .:• •- * v . / « . • " • •- s •* •' .-' ounty, it 
really costs very little to wait the 30-45 days necessary to provide all the 
required notices and hearing. The cost of publishing notice is de minimus and 
the delay fairly short. It is hard to conceive of a situation where a count)1 w m > Id 
need the n ione> so badly tl lat it coi lid i lot wait si ich a short time. Balanced 
against the minimal cost to the County is the "cost" to the Citizens of losing an 
irreplaceable piece of park property. That kind of cost is hard to measure. 
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C. Problem is Easy to "Fix" if the Burden is Too Great 
If the counties view the burden of notice and a hearing as too great, 
it is certainly very easy to get the problem "fixed" at the legislature. Counties 
have had one of the strongest lobbies on the Hill for many decades. The matter 
could be "fixed" in a heartbeat, by a clarifying statute.6 
D. Violence to Venerable Principles of Statutory Construction. 
The defendants' position does great violence to long-established 
principles of statutory construction, whereas the Citizens argue for a very 
reasonable statutory construction. The County and Jones would have this Court 
ignore the § 305(2) words, "before selling any property," or add words they say 
are implied, if a "change in use is anticipated." County Brief p. 24 (2nd line from 
the bottom). To adopt the Citizens' interpretation of the statutes, the Court need 
only read the words in § 305 literally. "Before selling any public ground, place, 
[or] property," the matter must be submitted to the planning commission for its 
review and the county commission "shall also amend the general plan." 
§ 305(2)(a) and (b) (brackets added and ellipses removed). Amending the 
general plan requires a 14-day notice and a public hearing by both the planning 
6
 Of course, it is hard to believe that the legislators would vote affirmatively for 
lack of public notice and a hearing for the sale of public property. 
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and understandable.7 
Additionally, the County contends that §242 gives it broad, 
unregulated power to sell its property without notice and a hearing. See Weber 
a more specific statute governs instead of a more general statute." De Baritault 
v. Salt Lake City, 913 P.2d 743,747-48 (Utah 1996) (internal citations omitted). 
Though the County receives a general grant of power to sell its property via 
K --1- , \v hen selling put i,
 t:i, ; . ..esci ibed by a general plai; . .:. i . . v 
tnc o-. ' • . - * * ' " : ^ \ W4,ai id 303. 
Furthermore, the County seeks to have the benefit of CLUDMA 
without being burdened by it. The County argues that the 30-day statute of 
limitations of § 17-27- ^2) applies and in the same breath contends that the 
i * • • - .. . • -; v * s of § 17-27 3 05 do it IC t See Coi mty Bi ief pps. 9-
10,19. The County cannot have it both ways. To render consistent meaning to 
CLUDMA, the Court should apply and enforce § 305 and hold that the statute 
of limitations was not triggered in this case because there was no public notice. 
7 j ^ County asks mockingly what type of General Plan amendment "would be 
required . . . where no change of use is anticipated," and then claims that "Appellants 
have never provided a satisfactory answer to that critical question." County Brief pps. 
24-5. The question has several false premises, of course, but the answer is simple. The 
amending ordinance would read: "After notice and a hearing, the Ogden Valley 
General Plan is hereby amended to allow the sale of the WCPP to for the 
sum of $ ." 
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This interpretation avoids the tortured reading urged by Weber County, which 
rams a 30-day S.O.L. down the public's throat, when the public had no notice. 
The Citizens' position is much more in keeping with traditional 
principles of statutory construction because it is not necessary to supply implied 
terms, as is the case with the interpretation urged by the County. On balance, 
there is little to advocate the County's position and much to advocate the 
Citizens' position. The sale should be voided. 
E. The County Currently Requires Notice and a Hearing. 
It is disingenuous for the County to argue or imply burdens and 
impracticality when over four years ago. it adopted a local ordinance requiring 
notice and hearing, similar to the state statute. The County claims: "Similarly, 
the County's ordinance dealing with the sale of real property, § 6-11-12 (B) 
(R. 344), does not contain any requirement for notice or hearing." County Brief 
p. 13. This statement was technically true as of the day of the sale, but is no 
longer true. Just three months after the March 11, 1997 sale, Weber County 
amended its ordinance to require public notice and a hearing for the sale of 
most Weber County property. The County admitted this to the trial court.8 
8
 "Although the County has since modified its ordinance regulating the 
sale of real property . . . ." R. 338 (4 lines from the bottom). It was also made 
clear to the trial court by the County, on several occasions during oral arguments, that 
notice and hearing was now required to sell County real property. 
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Acertif xt irrentCol it 1 ty ordinances is attached hei et: :> 
as Addendum 5. The Court will note that § 6-1 ±-12 was amended on June 26, 
1997. With respect to real property, the ordinance has a host of healthy 
requirements before the property can be sold, including a certified appraisal if 
the ; iliie is greate r than $5,000. ( J 1 i tl l G >c:k : \i u i § 6 1 1 12(B)( %) If 1 .he 5 re; i 1 
pi oper ty is " in pi iblic - \ ise,' *" it can be sold only "after a public hearing with notice 
as required herein." Id. at § 6-11-12(C). If the real property is considered "not 
in public use," there is a requirement that the property first be formally declared 
"surplus," then advertised in a newspaper and then approved at a coi n lty 
commissioi i n leeting i lot less thai i 10 days a ftei 1:1: le declaration, "so tl lat 
interested persons may submit comments regarding the disposition to the board 
of county commissioners." § 6-11-12(D)(1). There are a host of other 
restrictions in the ordinance, including disposal of real property by "marketing 
through ar sal estate agent," "advertising," i :pps. 6-1 9, Ironically , 1:1 le 
state statute is less burdensome than the county ordinance in many ways. In any 
event, the County has for years self-imposed upon itself a notice and hearing 
"burden." 
Incidentally , this Coi 11 1: may take ji idicia 1 i lotice of sta tutes ai id 
ordinances. Mel Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah 1988). 
Under Trimble, the appellate court can judicially notice a matter that is not 
"raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at 456. Since this matter was raised by 
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the County and considered below (R. 334, 338), it is appropriate for judicial 
notice here. See also, Utah Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
REPLY POINT IV 
- Right of Way Issue Not Moot -
THE COUNTY'S SALE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY WITH-
OUT NOTICE AND A HEARING IS NOT A MOOT ISSUE. 
A JUDICIAL ADMISSION DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A 
RECONVEYANCE. 
A. Introduction. 
Both defendants strenuously argue that the right of way issue is 
"moot" because of a judicial admission in the trial court below. County Brief 
p. 30; Jones Brief p. 14. In reality, the issue is not moot, at least not totally, and 
should be addressed by this Court. 
B. A Judicial Admission Does Not Vest Title in Real Property. 
A judicial admission in a pleading is an admission of fact and 
"normally conclusive on the party making it." Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 161 
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). However, a court "may relieve a party from the 
consequences of a judicial admission." Id. The function of a judicial admission 
is predominantly evidentiary in nature. See Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 
495 (Utah 1984). Moreover, basic property law establishes that a right-of-way 
is an interest in land and, as such, may only be transferred by deed. See Wykoff 
v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982) (right of way transferred by deed is 
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limited to scope am 101 u icedi i ltl le instrument). In this case, the Appellees made 
a judicial admission that the R.O.W. was "inadvertently" transferred to Rulon 
Jones by the Quit Claim Deed, R 683. The point is, it was transferred, and 
there is no returning deed, so the issue is still "alive." 
Defendai its misi it iderstand a ji idicia 1 admission It bh ids tl les z 
parties only for this litigation. But defendants mistakenly imply that this judicial 
admission is tantamount to a conveyance of property that would benefit the 
public at large. It is ilot. As of the current time, the property is vested w ith 
indicate otherwise. There is no deed back from Jones, which would resolve the 
issue. When the case is over, the judicial admission is gone. 
Title still rests with Jones. Nothing short of a deed from Jones will 
transfer the El .0 \ v I: acl : to 1:1 le Coi u it> & \ \ i II ri >koff, 6 4 6 : 
Appellees lu ^ - .admitted the "error" in open eotnp (he admission uoe&nui v.uic 
the alleged "mistake." If Appellees are serious about rectifying this "mistake," 
Jones should tender a deed to Weber County. He has not done so. One wonders 
N oil: :i ii ig less \ \ ill ei isure tha 1: tl le R O V v .,:v ill remaii I opei I ai id 
enforceable. The issue is not moot. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees Rulon Jones and Weber County, declare the sale 
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of the WCPP void as a matter of law, and remand the case to the Second Judicial 
District for further proceedings. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2001 
LOBERT B. SYKES 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Tab 5 
6-11-9 Bonds of Bidders may be Required. The Purchasing Agent may require bidders 
to supply deposits of good faith, or bonds with sufficient sureties, in such amounts as shall be 
deemed adequate and approved by the Board of County Commissioners, not only to insure 
performance of the contract or purchase order in the time and manner prescribed, but also to save, 
indemnify, and hold the County harmless against losses, damages, claims, liabilities, judgements, 
costs and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the grant of the contract or purchase orders. 
6-11-10 Purchase Orders Required. The purchase order shall be used whenever goods 
and limited services are to be acquired by outright purchase, with payment to be made after the 
goods and services have been delivered or performed and accepted, and where the delivery of all 
items or the performance of all services is expected to occur at the same time. Open purchase orders 
shall be used where goods or services will be supplied or take place each month and the amount is 
either the same each month or items purchased are of such a nature that requesting departments are 
not able to order in advance and wait for Commission approval. The purchase order shall specify 
the nature of goods or services to be acquired, the purchase price thereof, freight charges, prompt 
payment discounts, the delivery date, the person or entity from whom the same is being acquired, 
the department, division, or agency for whom the acquisition is being made, and such other 
provisions as may be appropriate or required. The purchase order shall incorporate by reference all 
the terms, conditions, and specifications, if any, contained in the request for bids. 
6-11-11 Bilateral Contracts Required. 
A. Whenever personal property is acquired by means of lease, rental or installment 
purchase; 
B. Whenever personal or professional services are required by the County except; 
] Where the services are to be performed at the vendors place of business or where the 
services are for non repetitive repairs or maintenance and where a purchase order has 
been bid or negotiated to cover said services; 
C. Whenever consultant services are to be acquired and such services require 
participation by the County which involves funding, performance or assumption of liability or risk. 
in I! I } h i s | i u s , i l ill ' in phis rnipertv. (Amended by Ord. #97-12, 6/26/97) 
A Personal Property. The power to dispose of surplus, obsolete, or unusable personal 
property held by the County is vested in the County Purchasing Agent. The Board of 
Commissioners shall declare such property as may be surplus, obsolete or unusable and authorize 
the Purchasing Agent to dispose of said property in any manner that the Purchasing Agent deems 
to be in the best interest of the public. Such disposition may be by sale, salvage, trade, donation or 
disposal as appropriate. Purchasing Agent may approve individual departmental policies regarding 
disposal of specialized County property. 
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B. Real Property. The power to dispose of surplus real property owned by the County 
is vested in the Property Management Division of the Operations Department, and shall be disposed 
of in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. 
1. Real property in public use and real property not in public use, which terms are 
more fully defined below, may be disposed of by public auction, by listing with 
a licensed Realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by sealed bid, or as otherwise 
approved by the Board of County Commissioners after the property is declared 
surplus by the Board of County Commissioners. County Commissioners may 
refuse any or all offers or bids for real property. 
2. Any real property for which an offer has been received or which the Property 
Management Division determines should be disposed of, the description thereof 
shall first be submitted to the County Surveyor's Office for verification and 
approval of the description. Further action should not be taken on the sale of the 
property until the legal description has been verified by the County Surveyor's 
Office. 
3. If the real property proposed for disposition is adjacent to or may reasonably be 
used for water-shed management, recreation, grazing, or wildlife protection, then 
the offer to purchase or description of the property shall be referred to the Public 
Lands Advisory Council for review and comment prior to it being declared 
surplus. The Council shall have twenty-one (21) days from the time it receives 
the request from the Property Management Division or the Board of County 
Commissioners in which to review the proposal and return comments to the 
Board of County Commissioners. 
4. If the assessed value of the property as determined by the records of the County 
Assessor's Office is less than $5,000, then the property may be declared surplus 
and marketed without further determination of value. If the assessed value is 
greater than $5,000, then an opinion of value letter by a licensed Real Estate 
Broker or a certified appraisal from an Appraiser shall be procured before the 
property is declared surplus and sold. An appraisal shall not be required if an 
appraisal on the property has been provided within the past twenty-four (24) 
months. 
C. Real Property In Public Use. The disposition of public property that is in public use, 
regardless of the value thereof, shall be made only with the approval of the Board of County 
Commissioners after a public hearing with notice as required herein. 
1. "Real property in public use" means governmental offices or other public 
buildings, courts, jails, sheriffs offices, developed parks or other recreational 
facilities, libraries, other educational facilities, animal control facilities, sanitary 
landfills, or any other realty or improvement thereon, except public roads or 
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public rights of way, held for the benefit or advantage of the general public and 
not confined to use by privileged or particular individuals, without regard to 
whether that use may be classified as governmental or proprietary. 
2. The Board shall call and hold a public hearing concerning disposition of real 
property in public use, which hearing may be at any special or regularly 
scheduled meeting of the Board, at which hearing all interested persons may 
appear and be heard. Public notice shall be given of the hearing, which shall 
contain the date, time and place thereof, a statement of the purpose of the hearing, 
and a description of the property or interest therein to be disposed of. Such 
notice shall be published at least once prior to the hearing in a newspaper of 
general circulation of the County, and the hearing shall be held not sooner than 
ten (10) days after the publication of the notice thereof. 
Real Property Not in Pi ifaiic Use 
1. The Property Management Division may dispose of real property not in public 
use in any manner authorized in this Chapter after notice has been published in 
a newspaper of general circulation in Weber County identifying the property by 
land serial number. The sale or other transaction divesting the County of such 
real property shall be approved at a County Commission Meeting not less than 
ten (10) days after it has been declared surplus so that interested persons may 
submit comments regarding the disposition to the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
2. "Real property not in public use" means real property including but not limited 
to vacant lands; real property with vacant or unused buildings, structures or other 
improvements thereon; buildings used as maintenance or repair facilities not open 
to the general public; buildings leased by the County to private entities; or any 
other realty or improvements thereon not held for the benefit or advantages of the 
public nor open to the general public or a substantial portion thereof. 
Approval by Board and Record Keeping. 
1. No disposition of real or personal property, in public use or otherwise, shall be 
finalized until after the Board, at a regularly scheduled Commission Meeting, 
shall have reviewed and approved the manner of disposition. 
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2, The County Clerk shall maintain permanent public records reflecting the 
description of the property sold or otherwise conveyed, an appraisal of the 
property or opinion of value letter if required by this ordinance, the manner of 
disposition, the consideration received by the County, the identity of the person 
to whom such property was sold or otherwise disposed of, the date of the 
disposition, the date of approval by the Board, and the nature of the County's use 
of the property prior to disposition. 
REAL PROPERTY SALES 
INTERNAL POLICY AND ORDINANCE 
Internal Policy 
A. All proposed property purchases from the County shall flow tlirough the Property 
Management Division of Operations and shall be governed initially by the County's 
internal policy. 
1. Property Management Division receives offer. 
2. Property Management Division refers that offer to the Surveyor to determine if the 
confirmation that the property exists as listed (extinguish if not). 
3. Property Management Division approaches Commission to see if Commission deems 
surplus. 
4. If Commission deems surplus then appraisal of properties in excess of $10,000, 
opinion letter of more than $2,500 but less than $10,000 County Commission deems 
surplus then Ordinance comes into play. 
Ordinance 
A. County Commission must declare surplus on all real property before sale. 
1. If real property is in public use then Commission must hold a public hearing with at 
least ten (10) days notice. 
2. If property is not in public use then dispose of according to the ordinance. 
3. Disposal by marketing through a real estate agent. 
4. Negotiation 
5. Sealed Bid 
6. Other advertising 
6-19 
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